

Tolerable magnitudes for induced seismicity at offshore carbon capture and storage projects

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Keywords

Induced seismicity; ground motions, tolerable magnitudes, carbon capture and storage, North Sea

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Declaration of Competing Interests

JPV leads the Bristol and Oxford Passive Seismic (BOPS) project. BOPS is funded by a range of operating and oilfield service companies, many of whom are currently in the process of developing CCS projects around the UK and elsewhere. JPV and BE have acted and continue to act as independent consultants for a variety of organisations including hydrocarbon operating companies and governmental organisations on issues pertaining to induced seismicity. None of these organisations had any input into the conception, development, or analyses presented in this study.

ABSTRACT

27 *Induced seismicity is a risk that must be managed during the development of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)*
28 *projects. A key step in effective management of induced seismicity is the definition of a tolerable magnitude*
29 *threshold, M_{TOL} , which defines the level at which the nuisance or damage caused by induced seismicity is likely*
30 *to no longer be tolerated by affected populations. Having established M_{TOL} , induced seismicity mitigation*
31 *strategies can be implemented with the objective to avoid induced events that exceed M_{TOL} . In this study our*
32 *objective is to estimate M_{TOL} for CCS developments in the waters around the UK. Siting CCS operations offshore*
33 *reduces, but does not eliminate, the risks posed by induced seismicity by increasing the distance from exposed*
34 *populations. For a given induced earthquake location and magnitude, we use ground motion models, nuisance*
35 *and fragility functions, and population densities, to estimate the numbers of households that would experience*
36 *different levels of disturbance and damage. We use past cases of induced seismicity that were, or were not,*
37 *accepted by the public to define risk tolerances based on the numbers of households that experience different*
38 *levels of disturbance or damage. We sense-check our results through comparison with observed macroseismic*
39 *impacts from past, natural earthquakes located in the seas around the UK. As expected, we find that the strongest*
40 *control on M_{TOL} is the distance to the shore from the proposed project. Our results can be used by CCS operators*
41 *and regulators in designing induced seismicity mitigation strategies for their sites.*

42

43 1. INTRODUCTION

44 Carbon capture and storage (CCS) entails the capture of CO₂ at large power generation and industrial
45 facilities and its subsequent storage in suitable geological repositories. CCS is seen as a key technology
46 for meeting net zero targets for many industrialised nations (e.g., BEIS, 2021; Jones and Lawson,
47 2022). However, the injection of large volumes of CO₂ into the subsurface carries the risk of causing
48 induced seismicity (Zoback and Gorelick, 2012; Verdon, 2014): this risk must be managed to ensure
49 the successful development of a CCS industry.


50 Other industries that create subsurface perturbations have experienced induced seismicity, including
51 conventional hydrocarbon production (e.g., Segall, 1989), geothermal energy (e.g., Zang et al., 2014),
52 hydraulic fracturing (e.g., Schultz et al., 2020a), wastewater disposal (e.g., Watkins et al., 2023), and
53 natural gas storage (e.g., Cesca et al., 2021). In a handful of cases, induced earthquakes have led to
54 sufficiently strong ground motions to cause damage to nearby buildings and infrastructure (e.g., Lee
55 et al., 2019; Lei et al., 2019; Campbell et al., 2020). Where induced earthquakes are large enough to
56 be felt, they become a source of significant public concern even if magnitudes are not large enough to
57 cause damage (Evensen et al., 2022). The occurrence of induced seismicity has seen regulators respond
58 by imposing strict regulatory measures; sometimes closing culpable projects, such as gas production
59 at Groningen in the Netherlands (van de Graaff et al., 2018), geothermal energy projects at Basel in
60 Switzerland and Pohang in South Korea (Håring et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2019), and natural gas storage
61 at the Castor site, Spain (Cesca et al., 2021); or imposing significant limitations on injection rates, such
62 as for wastewater disposal in Oklahoma (OCC, 2016). In the UK, a nationwide moratorium on shale
63 gas extraction was imposed because of the perceived inability to manage injection-induced seismicity
64 (BEIS, 2019).

65 Induced seismicity has been observed at CCS sites (Verdon et al., 2011; 2013; Stork et al., 2015;
66 Dando et al., 2021; Goertz-Allmann et al., 2024), although to date the magnitudes have been small.
67 Nevertheless, these instances demonstrate the importance of managing induced seismicity during CCS
68 operations as the industry grows. Shutdown of CCS projects due to the occurrence of larger magnitude
69 induced events, as has happened in other industries, would have a significant impact on the growth of
70 this nascent technology.

71 In the UK, the focus of CCS-related activities has been offshore in the North Sea, Irish Sea, and English
72 Channel. The UK government (via the relevant regulator, the North Sea Transition Authority, NSTA)
73 has so far issued 28 licenses for “carbon dioxide appraisal and storage” (we refer to these as “CCS
74 Licenses” hereafter) in these areas (Figure 1). Operational injection of CO₂ at some of these licensed
75 sites is expected to begin by the late 2020s.

76 The siting of CCS operations offshore can significantly reduce the risks posed by induced seismicity
77 by reducing the exposed population. However, earthquakes induced offshore can still be felt onshore.
78 Induced seismicity at the Castor natural gas storage project provides an important case study in this
79 regard (Cesca et al., 2021): even though the injection site was over 20 km offshore the induced events,
80 which exceeded magnitude M 4.0, were felt by the local population onshore from the site, leading to
81 local opposition and the shutdown of the project. Past tectonic earthquakes in the seas around the UK
82 have been widely felt – the largest tectonic earthquake to have occurred in the UK, the 1931 *M* 6.1
83 Dogger Bank event, was in the southern North Sea near to the location of several CCS license blocks
84 (Musson, 2007). The 5.7–5.8 *M_L* 1580 Dover Straits earthquake, which occurred 15 – 20 km offshore
85 (although its exact location highly uncertain), is considered one of the most damaging earthquakes to
86 have hit the UK, with two deaths in England and several others reported in France and Belgium.

87



88 *Figure 1: Map of CCS licenses (blue) released by the North Sea Transition Authority in the waters*
 89 *around the UK. The black boxes show our five study regions, and the coloured stars show specific*
 90 *study locations at which risk curves are computed. For ease of visualisation, we split our map into*
 91 *northern and southern portions.*

92

93

94 **1.1 Management of Induced Seismicity Hazard**

95 Induced seismicity can be managed prior to operations during site selection, and during operations by
 96 real time monitoring and decision-making (e.g., Verdon and Bommer, 2021; Schultz et al., 2024a).

97 The occurrence of induced seismicity requires the presence of critically stressed tectonic faults. The
 98 likelihood of induced seismicity will therefore be increased by an greater abundance of faulting (e.g.,
 99 Schultz et al., 2016; Wozniakowska and Eaton, 2020; Rodríguez-Pradilla and Verdon, 2024), by
 100 elevated pore pressures (e.g., Eaton and Schultz, 2018), and by elevated stress conditions (e.g., Verdon
 101 and Rodríguez-Pradilla, 2023). These criteria can be used to screen potential targets during the site
 102 selection and characterisation phase. However, in practice *a priori* mitigation of induced seismicity in
 103 this way is often unsuccessful. In particular, the identification of potentially seismogenic faults during
 104 site characterisation can be challenging. Faults of sufficient size to host M 4.0 earthquakes (i.e.,
 105 roughly km length scale) may only have a displacement of tens of metres, putting them at the limits of
 106 resolution for typical reflection seismic surveys (Nantanoi et al., 2022; Rodríguez-Pradilla and Verdon,
 107 2024). Strike-slip faults, which do not produce vertical offset, can be even harder to identify using
 108 geophysical methods. Furthermore, the stress perturbations that generate induced seismicity can
 109 propagate downwards to reactivate faults in basement strata that are often not investigated in detail
 110 during site characterisation. As such, numerous cases exist where faults that hosted induced seismicity
 111 were not identified during site characterisation (e.g., Eaton et al., 2018; Cesca et al., 2021; Nantanoi
 112 et al., 2022).

113 Instead, induced seismicity is typically managed by real-time decision-making during operations.
 114 Monitoring systems are installed to detect and characterise induced seismic events and this information
 115 is used to evaluate the upcoming seismic hazard and to adjust the planned injection program
 116 accordingly. In the simplest form, this approach takes the form of a Traffic Light System (TLS), where
 117 pre-set magnitude thresholds are defined, typically an “amber light” at which injection rates are
 118 reduced and a “red light” at which injection is stopped (Bommer et al., 2006). TLSs are inherently
 119 retroactive (decisions are taken in response to observed events), so considerable thought must be given
 120 to setting the amber and red thresholds (M_{AMB} and M_{RED}) relative to the actual risk-related objective

121 (e.g., Schultz et al., 2020b; Verdon and Bommer, 2021). TLSs are the most widely used regulatory
122 approach to the management of induced seismicity (Kendall et al., 2019).

123 As induced seismicity forecasting models have improved, alternative methods, often referred to as
124 Adaptive Traffic Light Systems (ATLSs, Mignan et al., 2017), have been proposed. In this approach,
125 the observed seismicity is used to populate a statistical model that forecasts the upcoming seismicity.
126 The two most common modelling strategies for this purpose are either (i) based on assumptions of
127 linear scaling between injection rates and seismicity rates (e.g., Shapiro et al., 2010; Hallo et al., 2014;
128 Langenbruch et al., 2018; Mancini et al., 2021; Verdon et al., 2024), or (ii) using extreme value theory
129 (e.g., Cao et al., 2021; Watkins et al., 2023; Verdon and Eisner, 2024; Schultz et al., 2024b).

130 In an ATLS, operations can be amended or stopped if the likelihood of an event of unacceptable
131 magnitude, as estimated by the forecasting model, exceeds a given threshold. This type of approach
132 has now been applied to guide live decision-making at several active injection sites (e.g., Verdon,
133 2016; Clarke et al., 2019; Kwiatek et al., 2019; Kettlety et al., 2021).

134

135 **1.2 Tolerable Magnitudes**

136 What these methods share is the need to establish an acceptable level of risk. This is achieved by
137 defining a maximum tolerable magnitude. This point represents the level at which the impact of
138 induced seismicity, defined by either the nuisance of felt events experienced by the public, or the
139 damage to buildings and infrastructure, becomes intolerable. We refer to this tolerable magnitude as
140 M_{TOL} hereafter. For TLSs, M_{RED} must be set an appropriate level below M_{TOL} to ensure that magnitude
141 jumps and/or trailing seismicity (continued induced earthquakes that occur after injection has stopped)
142 do not exceed M_{TOL} (e.g., Schultz et al., 2020b; Verdon and Bommer, 2021; Zhou et al., 2024). For
143 ATLSs, M_{TOL} must be defined such that operations are stopped or amended if forecasting models
144 indicate that this threshold is likely to be breached.

145 We note that M_{TOL} is determined by the ground motions produced by a given event as experienced by
146 local populations and infrastructure. The ground motions will depend on the earthquake hypocentre,
147 the local ground characteristics, and the distance to the exposed population. However, these factors
148 are typically relatively constant for a given injection site: induced earthquake hypocentres will be
149 located within the region that is perturbed by the injection; the local ground characteristics will not
150 change over the typical durations of interest; and nor will the locations of exposed populations. As
151 such, M_{TOL} can typically be defined for a given injection site based on considerations of expected
152 ground motions for a given magnitude event at the injection site, as felt by nearby populations.

153 M_{TOL} will also depend on willingness of a local population to tolerate induced seismicity, and on the
154 vulnerability of exposed buildings. Public communication campaigns undertaken prior to the onset of
155 operations can help the public to understand and expect induced seismicity, which can improve public
156 willingness to tolerate it. In extreme cases, Bommer et al. (2015) proposed that structural upgrading
157 of vulnerable buildings could be a more appropriate way of managing induced seismicity risks that
158 cannot otherwise be avoided.

159 Schultz et al. (2023) developed a method to characterise tolerable magnitudes for induced seismicity
160 specifically within the context of UK shale gas development. They estimated the tolerance of the public
161 for given impacts (e.g., nuisance and damage) based on the impacts generated by observed events, and
162 the public and regulatory response thereto. Given the current situation with respect to CCS
163 developments around the UK (and given that the moratorium on shale gas development in the UK
164 remains in place), there is a clear need to reprise this analysis for the CCS license blocks that have
165 been awarded by the NSTA.

166 In estimating tolerable levels of induced seismicity for UK shale gas operations, Schultz et al. (2023)
167 went one step further. Since the regulator had applied TLS regulations to shale gas activities in the
168 UK, Schultz et al. (2023) sought to estimate appropriate TLS M_{RED} thresholds based on assumptions
169 about magnitude jumps and trailing seismicity. In contrast, the relevant regulatory bodies have not
170 specified how they intend to manage induced seismicity risks during CCS development in the UK. Our
171 preference in this study is therefore to estimate M_{TOL} , the magnitude threshold at which we anticipate
172 that the impacts of induced seismicity from CCS would become intolerable to the public, thereby
173 leaving open the question of how best to ensure that these levels are not exceeded.

174 We note that in estimating M_{TOL} based on the response of the public to nuisance and/or damage, we do
175 not consider the potential impacts of induced seismicity on offshore infrastructure, which will consist
176 of the pipelines, platforms and wells of the CO₂ injection facilities themselves, and may also include
177 offshore hydrocarbon pipelines, wells and platforms (some of which may have been decommissioned),
178 and offshore wind farms. Separate induced seismicity risk assessments may be required for such
179 structures. Also, we do not consider the potential geomechanical hazards posed by induced seismicity,
180 such as deformation of wellbores due to fault slip, or the creation of permeable leakage pathways
181 through sealing caprocks (e.g., Verdon et al., 2013).

182 **2. METHOD**

183 Our approach is based on the methods developed by Schultz et al. (2021a; 2021b; 2023). We briefly
184 recap the approach here. Since we are only interested in defining M_{TOL} in this study, we do not
185 incorporate trailing seismicity effects. The Schultz et al. (2023) approach is based on a Monte Carlo
186 analysis of the impacts of induced seismicity occurring at a given location. Ground motions are
187 simulated for a given earthquake position and magnitude. Nuisance and fragility functions are then
188 used to estimate the likelihood of experiencing different levels of nuisance and damage states. These
189 likelihoods are then used to estimate the numbers of households that would experience a given impact,
190 based on population density maps.

191 Schultz et al. (2023) evaluated the tolerability of a given level of impact based on the impacts of
192 previous induced seismic events in the UK. Based on estimated levels of nuisance and damage for past
193 acceptable and non-acceptable induced events, Schultz et al. (2023) were able to infer acceptable
194 tolerances for different levels of nuisance and damage in terms of the aggregate numbers of households
195 affected.

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
197 **2.1. Ground Motions and Impacts**

198 For a given earthquake hypocentre and magnitude, we compute peak ground velocities (PGV) using
199 the Edwards et al. (2021) ground motion model (GMM). This GMM was developed specifically for
200 induced seismicity at UK shale gas sites. In order to account for anelastic attenuation due to the longer
201 distances involved in the CCS cases considered here, we implement the additional distance scaling
202 term (-0.0006R) recommended by Atkinson (2015). In implementation for our target sites, site
203 amplification effects were estimated using a global slope-based proxy for V_{S30} (Heath et al., 2020),
204 shown in Figure 2. In our Monte Carlo analysis (see below), V_{S30} values are perturbed by their standard
205 errors, and ground motions outputs are perturbed according to their inter-event standard deviation.
206 Ground motions are further perturbed by a spatially correlated intra-event error calibrated for European
207 data (Esposito and Iervolino, 2012; Edwards et al., 2021).

208 We translate modelled ground motions into probabilities of experiencing different impacts based on
209 nuisance/fragility functions. We categorise the degree of nuisance by Community Decimal Intensity
210 (CDI, Wald et al., 2012), where levels CDI-2 – CDI-6 correspond to “just felt”, “exciting”, “somewhat

211 frightening”, “frightening”, and “extremely frightening”. We use the nuisance function developed by
 212 Schultz et al. (2021c) to estimate the likelihood of experiencing these CDI levels as a function of PGV.
 213 At low PGV values (< 0.1 mm/s) the shape of the respective nuisance curves estimated by Schultz et
 214 al. (2021c) creates the implausible outcome that the likelihood of experiencing higher CDI levels (CDI-
 215 3 – CDI-6) becomes higher than that of lower CDI levels (CDI-2). This issue had an insignificant
 216 impact when applied by Schultz et al. (2023) to shale gas induced seismicity where large populations
 217 were found relatively close to the proposed sites. However, for offshore CCS sites this becomes an
 218 issue because populations are all relatively far from the modelled hypocentres, and so all receive low
 219 ground-motions for moderate magnitude events, creating the outcome that the risk curves for higher
 220 CDI levels can be above those for lower CDI levels. We correct this by setting the likelihoods for
 221 nuisance to zero below a PGV of 0.1 mm/s. Note that British Standards BS 5228 (BSI, 2014) gives the
 222 threshold for perception of vibrations at 0.14 – 0.3 mm/s.

223



224 *Figure 2: Maps of UK population (a) and V_{S30} based on slope proxy (b). CCS licenses are shown in*
 225 *blue. For ease of visualisation, we split each map into northern and southern portions*

226

227 We use the fragility function computed for induced seismicity at Groningen in the Netherlands
 228 (Korswagen et al., 2019) to compute the likelihood of damage for a given PGV value. The likelihood
 229 of damage is estimated at two states, DS-1, which corresponds to visible light damage (> 0.1 mm
 230 cracks) and DS-2, which represents easily observable light damage (> 1 mm cracks). We set the
 231 likelihoods for damage to zero below a PGV of 0.5 mm/s. British Standards BS 5228 (BSI, 2014) gives

232 a lowermost threshold for cosmetic damage in unreinforced or light framed structures at 15 mm/s. The
233 damage function includes a pre-damage term Ψ_0 (Korswagen et al., 2019), which we sample from a
234 half-Gaussian distribution. Uncertainties in nuisance and damage functions were considered through
235 perturbations of their input parameters in our Monte Carlo analysis.

236 Schultz et al. (2023) also computed a third risk metric, the local personal risk (LPR) that computes the
237 likelihood of suffering a fatality due to building collapse, which can provide a useful comparison with
238 other risks. However, they found that the tolerable levels for nuisance and cosmetic damage (CDI-2 –
239 CDI-4 and DS-1 – DS-2) were reached at much lower magnitudes than the LPR threshold, and so LPR
240 did not define acceptable magnitudes for induced seismicity. As such, we do not calculate LPR in this
241 study.

242 The severity of risk, in terms of the numbers of households affected at a given nuisance or damage
243 level, is then estimated by multiplying the impact likelihood by the number of households at the given
244 grid point. Our populations (shown in Figure 2) are taken from the LandScan model (Rose et al., 2019)
245 and we assume, based on UK census data, an average of 2.4 residents per household to estimate the
246 numbers of households. The total numbers of households affected is then calculated by summing the
247 numbers from each grid point.

248 We adopt the criteria used by Schultz et al. (2023) to define the levels of tolerable impacts. Schultz et
249 al. (2023) reached these criteria by examining the impacts from induced earthquakes in the UK.
250 Specifically, they studied the Preese Hall (Clarke et al., 2014), Preston New Road PNR-1z (Clarke et
251 al., 2019) and Preston New Road PNR-2 (Kettlety et al., 2021) hydraulic fracturing-induced sequences
252 in Lancashire, and the Newdigate sequence in Surrey (Hicks et al., 2019), which were actually natural
253 earthquakes but nevertheless triggered a response from the regulator given their proximity to oilfield
254 operations. Schultz et al. (2023) computed the expected impact from each event in terms of nuisance
255 and damage using the modelling approach outlined above and assessed whether each of the events in
256 question were tolerated by nearby populations based on public and regulatory responses to each event.
257 By doing so, they were able to identify tolerances for each nuisance and damage criterion that seemed
258 to delimit acceptable versus unacceptable events.

259 From Schultz et al. (2023), the estimated tolerance of nuisance was reached when the median expected
260 numbers of affected households reached 9,571 for CDI-2, 5,478 for CDI-3, and 2,719 for CDI-4. The
261 estimated tolerance of damage was reached when the median expected numbers of affected households
262 reached 0.1 for DS-1 and 0.0001 for DS-2. The values for DS-1 and DS-2 being below 1 imply a 1-in-
263 10 and 1-in-10,000 chance of a household experiencing damage at these levels. The fact that the
264 Schultz et al. (2023) damage tolerances are less than 1 indicates that the public tolerance for induced
265 seismicity is such that earthquakes can be intolerable where damage, even of a cosmetic nature, is
266 unlikely to occur – nuisance alone can be sufficient to render a given level of induced seismicity impact
267 intolerable in the eyes of the public.

268 It is nevertheless of interest to examine magnitudes at which observed levels of damage (of a minor
269 and cosmetic nature) might begin to be observed. We therefore also compute an additional tolerance,
270 where the number of affected households exceeds 10 for DS-1. We refer to this tolerance as
271 $[N(DS-1) \geq 10]$ hereafter. As well as being of interest to operators of CCS sites as a magnitude at which
272 damage becomes likely (as opposed to the DS-1 and DS-2 criteria above, where the likelihood of
273 damage is still low, though not impossible), this threshold will also be relevant when comparing our
274 tolerance estimates with the observations of damage (or the lack thereof) from past natural earthquakes
275 located in the seas around the UK (see Section 4.2).


276 **2.2. Monte Carlo Sampling**

277 We use a Monte Carlo approach to sample the uncertainties in each of our input parameters. Within
278 each of our study areas (English Channel; East Irish Sea; southern North Sea; central North Sea;

279 northern North Sea; as shown in Figure 1), we sample potential induced earthquake source locations
 280 on “source grids” of 0.025° Latitude \times 0.05° Longitude (roughly 2.5×2.5 km) across five regions of
 281 interest: English Channel, East Irish Sea, southern North Sea, central North Sea, and northern North
 282 Sea (Figure 1). For each potential source location, we simulate earthquakes across a range of
 283 magnitudes from $1.0 \leq M \leq 6.5$, at 0.1 unit increments. We set our upper limit at $M 6.5$ as this value
 284 has been used to represent M_{MAX} (i.e., the maximum possible earthquake magnitude) for induced
 285 seismicity in the UK by Mancini et al. (2021), who adopted this value as it lies at the lower end of the
 286 range of values estimated for tectonic earthquakes. In curtailing our hazard calculations at this limit,
 287 we make no judgement as to where this value really does represent M_{MAX} for induced seismicity in the
 288 UK, since there are sound reasons why tectonic M_{MAX} values should not be adopted uncritically for
 289 induced seismicity cases (Bommer and Verdon, 2024).

290 For each source position and magnitude, we perform 1,000 iterations with random perturbations to
 291 each input parameter. For each modelled earthquake, we compute the shaking and the resulting impacts
 292 across a “shake grid” with increments of $0.05^\circ \times 0.05^\circ$ (Lat/Lon) that covers the entirety of the United
 293 Kingdom, plus Ireland and northern France (Figure 2).

294 CCS operations that seek to inject CO_2 as a supercritical fluid will target reservoirs that are deeper than
 295 700 – 800 m, though some projects may inject CO_2 in the gas phase at shallower depths. Observations
 296 show that induced earthquakes often occur in the crystalline basement underlying injection targets in
 297 sedimentary rocks (e.g., Verdon, 2014). We therefore sample earthquake depths across a uniform
 298 distribution from 1 – 5 km depth. Given the larger epicentral distances from the offshore CCS licenses
 299 to the nearest population centres, earthquake depth has a minor impact on our results, in contrast to the
 300 shale gas sites considered by Schultz et al. (2023), many of which were very close to population
 301 centres. The perturbations that we apply to each of the parameters that determine the ground motions
 302 and resulting impacts are shown in Figure 3.



303 *Figure 3: Perturbations applied to input variables for our Monte Carlo analysis.*

304

305 For each point in the source grid, the outcome is a risk curve that shows the numbers of households
 306 that would experience different impacts from induced earthquakes of different magnitudes. Example

307 curves for four selected sites are plotted in Figure 5. We define M_{TOL} at that source point as the
308 magnitude at which the median number of impacted households exceeds the tolerance for the given
309 impact metric, as defined above.

310

311 **3. RESULTS**

312 In Figure 4 we plot risk curves for five representative sites: Endurance (southern North Sea),
313 Morecambe (East Irish Sea), English Channel, Goldeneye (central North Sea), and Tern (northern
314 North Sea). The locations of these sites are plotted in Figure 1. As might be anticipated, the resulting
315 outcomes are strongly dependent on the positions of these sites relative to the coast. The English
316 Channel and Morecambe sites are both within 30 km of the coast, and near to relatively dense
317 population centres. As a result, the risk curves are higher. The Endurance site is approximately 65 km
318 from the shore, and the resulting curve is lower. The Goldeneye site is over 80 km from the shore, and
319 that shoreline is sparsely populated in northeast Scotland, while the Tern field is over 100 km from the
320 Shetland Islands, and over 350 km from the Scottish mainland. As a result, the risk curves for these
321 sites are significantly lower.

322 Comparing the risk curves in Figure 4 with those plotted in Schultz et al. (2023) (Figure 4 of that
323 paper), we see that our curves are generally steeper at lower magnitude values, with gradients
324 decreasing as magnitudes increase. In contrast, the curves generated by Schultz et al. (2023) are more
325 linear across the M vs. $\log[\text{No. of households}]$ space. This reflects the more binary nature of impacts
326 for the offshore sites modelled in our study, where if the ground motions are not large enough to be
327 felt onshore, then obviously they will impact nobody, but if they are large enough to have impact
328 onshore then those impacts could be felt by large numbers of people all along the shoreline. This
329 contrasts with the situation for onshore activities, where the numbers of people impacted will increase
330 relatively linearly with distance from the site in question.

331 In Figures 5 – 7 we map M_{TOL} values for nuisance and damage for each of the 5 study areas.
332 Specifically, we use the CDI-3, DS-1 and DS-2 tolerances defined by Schultz et al. (2023). The M_{TOL}
333 values for CDI-2 and CDI-4 are very similar to those for CDI-3 (see Supplementary Materials). We
334 find that M_{TOL} values for DS-1 are generally slightly higher than for CDI-3, typically by around 0.25
335 magnitude units, while the M_{TOL} values for DS-2 are significantly higher than for CDI-3, by around
336 1.5 magnitude units.


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
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



342 *Figure 4: Risk curves for five potential CCS sites around the UK, showing the numbers of*
 343 *households expected to experience a given impact (CDI-2 to CDI-4 (a – c), DS-1 (d), and DS-2 (e))*
 344 *as a function of magnitude. Solid lines show median values from our Monte Carlo analysis, dashed*
 345 *lines show 5 % and 95 % upper and lower values. The curve colours correspond to the five positions*
 346 *mapped as coloured stars in Figure 1: turquoise = English Channel; orange = Morecambe gas field,*
 347 *East Irish Sea; red = Endurance, southern North Sea, green = Goldeneye, central North Sea,*
 348 *purple = Tern site, northern North Sea. Note that no DS-2 impacts are reached for the Tern site*
 349 *within our magnitude range. Horizontal black dashed lines show risk tolerances defined by Schultz*
 350 *et al. (2023).*

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
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

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356 *Figure 5: Maps of M_{TOL} values based on nuisance impacts (CDI-3) for each of our 5 study areas:*
 357 *northern North Sea (a), central North Sea (b), East Irish Sea (c), southern North Sea (d), and*
 358 *English Channel (e). CCS license blocks are outlined in light blue, and the full study areas are*
 359 *outlined in black.*

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
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

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364 *Figure 6: Maps of M_{TOL} values based on damage impacts (DS-1) for each of our 5 study areas.*
365 *Figure format as per Figure 5.*

366



367



368
369

370 *Figure 7: Maps of M_{TOL} values based on damage impacts (DS-2) for each of our 5 study areas.*
 371 *Figure format as per Figure 5. M_{TOL} values are left blank where magnitudes of M 6.5 did not exceed*
 372 *the risk tolerances.*

373

374 Our criterion whereby cosmetic damage might be expected to be observed, $[N(DS-1) \geq 10]$, is shown
 375 in Figure 8. This tolerance is generally around 1 to 1.5 magnitude units higher than the CDI-3 nuisance
 376 tolerance.

377 **4. DISCUSSION**

378 **4.1 M_{TOL} as a function of distance to shore**

379 Inspection of Figures 5 – 8 shows that the main control on M_{TOL} values is the distance from the
380 coastline. This is to be expected, because the distance from shore represents the minimum distance to
381 the nearest populations that could experience nuisance or damage, and therefore controls the ground
382 motions that are experienced for a given magnitude. To further investigate this, in Figure 9 we plot the
383 M_{TOL} values for nuisance and damage (CDI-3 and $[N(DS-1) \geq 10]$) for every grid point in our study
384 areas, as a function of the distance to the nearest point on the coast. We find that the M_{TOL} values for
385 the southern North Sea, East Irish Sea and English Channel fall along very similar trends. The M_{TOL}
386 values for the central and northern North Sea areas are substantially higher for a given distance to
387 shore, with the central North Sea typically being roughly 0.5 units higher at a given distance, and the
388 northern North Sea being roughly 1.0 units higher. This may reflect the fact that the shorelines facing
389 the central and northern North Sea areas are substantially less populated than those facing the East
390 Irish Sea, southern North Sea and English Channel.

391 For the northern North Sea, the nearest coastline is the Shetland Islands, which has a total population
392 of roughly 20,000 people. Since we assume 2.4 people per household, this amounts to only 8,333
393 households, so nearly every household would need to experience nuisance at CDI-3 to reach the
394 Schultz et al. (2023) tolerance. It might be argued that the Schultz et al. (2023) tolerances, calibrated
395 via experiences of induced seismicity in medium-sized English towns such as Blackpool and Crawley,
396 will not be appropriate for a small and isolated community such as the Shetland Islands, leading to an
397 overestimation of M_{TOL} . Additionally, consideration of local risk metrics for nuisance (rather than only
398 aggregate) could be incorporated into future work, to ensure that an individual’s chance of
399 experiencing nuisance is accommodated as well.

400 In Figures 9b and 9d, we show M_{TOL} as a function of the distance to the nearest population grid that
401 has a population of at least 10,000 people. This normalises the behaviour between the different study
402 areas to a degree. However, the M_{TOL} values for the central and northern North Sea areas are still
403 slightly higher at a given distance. This may reflect the fact the V_{S30} values for northern Scotland are
404 generally higher than England (Figure 2), resulting in lower amplification effects, and the fact that,
405 while there are high density population centres in northeastern Scotland (most notably Aberdeen and
406 Inverness), the general density of population is significantly lower.


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

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
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415 *Figure 8: Maps of M_{TOL} values based on a tolerance where minor damage might be expected ($N(DS-$
416 $l) = 10$), for each of our 5 study areas. Figure format as per Figure 5. M_{TOL} values are left blank
417 where magnitudes of M 6.5 did not exceed the risk tolerances.*

418
419



420 *Figure 9: M_{TOL} as a function of distance. In (a) we show M_{TOL} values for nuisance (CDI-3) for each*
 421 *of our study areas as a function of distance from the nearest coastline. In (b) we show the same as a*
 422 *function of distance from the nearest densely populated area (with a population > 10,000). In (c)*
 423 *and (d) we show the same for M_{TOL} values for damage [$N(DS-1) \geq 10$].*

424

425 4.2 Comparisons with past UK earthquakes


426 We can use the observed macroseismic impacts of past earthquakes around the UK in order to sense-
 427 check the M_{TOL} thresholds estimated above. Specifically, we examine the observed macroseismic
 428 impacts for past events and assess whether they are consistent with such events being tolerable if they
 429 had been induced events. Clearly this is a subjective judgement, as we cannot know whether these
 430 historical events, had they been induced by industrial activities, would have actually been tolerated or
 431 not. However, it is reasonable to assume that events that were strongly felt across widespread areas
 432 would be unlikely to be tolerable were they induced. Events that were mildly felt by small numbers of
 433 people in localised areas would be more likely to be tolerable. Offshore events that were not felt
 434 onshore would be tolerable. We compare the observed impacts with our M_{TOL} values for nuisance
 435 (CDI-3), and with our M_{TOL} values for damage at [$N(DS-1) \geq 10$].

436 It should be noted that the population densities at the time for historical events were significantly
 437 lower, which could serve to reduce the overall impact relative to our models (which use modern
 438 population densities), and that the following events are all natural earthquakes, most of which are
 439 located at greater depths than would be expected for induced earthquakes.

440 An exact match between observed impacts and our risk estimates should not be expected, given the
 441 above differences, as well as the inherent variability in earthquake ground motions and impacts. The

442 risk curves plotted in Figure 4 give an indication of this variability: the risk curves at 5 % and 95 %
 443 are typically around 0.50 – 0.75 magnitude units above and below the median values. Nevertheless,
 444 the observed impacts from these events can provide a useful guide as to whether our M_{TOL} estimates
 445 are realistic. Figure 10 shows a map of historical and instrumentally recorded earthquakes around the
 446 UK, with the specific earthquakes discussed below highlighted. We examine each CCS license area in
 447 turn.

448



449 *Figure 10: Map of historically identified (orange circles) and instrumentally recorded (red circles)*
 450 *earthquakes with $M \geq 3.0$ across the southern (a) and northern (b) UK. Events are sized by*
 451 *magnitude. Earthquakes discussed specifically in Section 4.1 are outlined in pink and labelled.*

452

453 *Southern North Sea*

454 The largest earthquake in the UK for which a reliable magnitude has been estimated is the July 1931
 455 M 6.1 Dogger Bank event in the southern North Sea (Versey, 1939). The estimated location for this
 456 event is quite close to several CCS license blocks. The event was felt across the whole of the UK, as
 457 well as parts of Ireland, northern France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and southern Norway.
 458 Minor damage occurred along the east coast of England (Musson, 2007), with cases of chimneys and
 459 plaster being damaged. The most notable example of damage was to the spire of the Wesleyan Chapel
 460 in Filey, which was rotated by 2 inches (Sargeant and Musson, 2009). However, in no case were the
 461 impacts severe enough to be unequivocally judged to be at VII on the Medvedev–Sponheuer–Karnik
 462 intensity scale (Neilson et al., 1986). Impacts of this nature would be unacceptable from an induced
 463 event from the perspectives of nuisance and damage. Our M_{TOL} value for nuisance at the location of
 464 this event is approximately $M_{TOL} = 4.1$, and our M_{TOL} for damage ($[N(DS-I) = 10]$) is approximately
 465 M 5.0. Hence, the fact that this event would likely not be tolerable in terms of nuisance as an induced
 466 event, and that it caused observable damage, is consistent with its magnitude exceeding both these
 467 values.

468 The February 1958 M 5.1 event in the southern North Sea was smaller than the Dogger Bank event
 469 described above, but it was closer to the coast. This event was felt along the east English coast, as far
 470 inland as Nottingham – including by members of the Royal Family at the Sandringham Estate in
 471 northern Norfolk (BGS, 2010). However, there was probably no damage from this event (BGS, 2010).

472 Our M_{TOL} value for nuisance at the location of this event is approximately M 3.8, and M_{TOL} for damage
473 is approximately M 4.9, so our model expectation is that this event would likely not be tolerable from
474 a nuisance perspective, and it could have the potential cause damage. Hence, the fact that the observed
475 impacts from this event would be unlikely to be tolerable in terms of nuisance is consistent with our
476 model. The absence of recorded damage for this event is not consistent with our model estimate but,
477 given the expected variability in outcomes as described above, not to a significant degree.

478 In August 2015, an M 4.1 event occurred in the southern North Sea, located close to the southernmost
479 CCS license blocks in this area. A few people in Sheringham and Hickling (two small towns in north
480 Norfolk, about 30 km apart) reported feeling “a slight, but noticeable, vibration for a few seconds”
481 (Galloway, 2016). The event was also felt by workers on the Shell Leman Alpha Complex, who
482 reported that they “felt the platform swaying and there was an audible bang” (Galloway, 2016). The
483 event was assigned a macroseismic intensity of III by the British Geological Survey. Given the small
484 number of felt reports, nuisance impacts from this event would likely be acceptable were they to come
485 from an induced event. However, given that people over 30 km apart reported feeling this event, then
486 it could potentially have been felt by many more people. It therefore likely falls at the upper limit of
487 tolerability. Our M_{TOL} value for nuisance at the position of this event is M 3.9, and for damage is M 4.9.
488 Although our nuisance threshold is slightly lower than the magnitude of this event, we do not consider
489 this to be inconsistent given the inherent variability in earthquake ground motions. The absence of
490 damage from this event is consistent with the event magnitude being below our damage threshold.

491

492 *English Channel*

493 Two earthquakes located in the English Channel to the south of Portsmouth, towards the southeast of
494 the CCS license block in this area, are reported in the BGS historical database (BGS, 2010) – with
495 M 4.5 in October 1734 and with M 4.3 in March 1750. Given the historical nature of these earthquakes,
496 their position and magnitude should be treated as being highly uncertain. Both events were reported
497 as felt across the south coast, from Bridport in Dorset to Brighton, and as far inland as Bath and London
498 (BGS, 2010). No damage is reported in the BGS database associated with these events. However,
499 given the area across which these events were felt, the nuisance impacts would likely be intolerable
500 for an induced event. These impacts are consistent with our M_{TOL} thresholds for the area in question –
501 M_{TOL} for nuisance is approximately M 3.8, while M_{TOL} for damage is approximately M 4.8.

502 In July 2011, an M 3.9 event was recorded in the English Channel, slightly to the southeast of the CCS
503 license block (Galloway, 2012). This event was felt along a 100 km stretch of the coastline between
504 Portsmouth and Eastbourne (Galloway, 2012). The BGS assigned a macroseismic intensity of III to
505 this event. The fact that this event falls above our M_{TOL} for nuisance but below our M_{TOL} for damage is
506 consistent with the fact that it was widely felt but did not cause any reported damage.

507

508 *East Irish Sea*

509 The largest historical event in the East Irish Sea was an M 5.1 event in March 1843. The BGS (2010)
510 database reports that this event was felt throughout most of northern England, southern Scotland,
511 northern Wales, and eastern Ireland. Along the northwestern coast of England, the event caused
512 considerable alarm, but no damage (BGS, 2010). Minor amounts of damage were reported on the Isle
513 of Man. Our M_{TOL} threshold for nuisance in this area is M 3.6, and our M_{TOL} for damage is
514 approximately M 4.6. The impacts from this event are consistent with its magnitude being significantly
515 larger than the M_{TOL} values for nuisance, and slightly larger than that for damage.

516 A magnitude M 3.3 event occurred August 2013 in the East Irish Sea, approximately 25 km from the
517 coast. Felt reports from this event came mostly along a short stretch of coast at the northern end of the

518 Fylde Peninsula, though single felt reports were also received from the Isle of Man, Anglesey and
519 Liverpool (Galloway, 2014). The felt reports generally indicate fairly mild impacts, though the BGS
520 assigned a macroseismic intensity of III (Galloway, 2014). The M_{TOL} thresholds for nuisance and
521 damage in this area are 3.3 and 4.3, respectively. The impacts from this event are consistent with its
522 magnitude being below our M_{TOL} for damage, and similar to our M_{TOL} for nuisance (given that the
523 event appears to have been somewhat widely felt, albeit not alarmingly so).

524

525 *Central and Northern North Sea*

526 Our M_{TOL} for damage in these regions generally exceeds the magnitudes of earthquakes that have
527 occurred in the central and northern North Sea, such that we do not expect to have seen damage from
528 such events. Across much of our central and northern North Sea study areas, our tolerance criteria for
529 damage were not reached at our assumed M_{MAX} value for induced seismicity ($M_{MAX} = 6.5$), and so no
530 M_{TOL} values have been estimated.

531 The 1927 M 5.7 event in the central North Sea was the second-largest British earthquake in the
532 twentieth century (Musson, 2007), after the southern North Sea event described above. It was felt over
533 most of Scotland and along the eastern coast of England. However, it did not cause any reported
534 damage (Musson, 2007). The location of this event lies between our central and northern North Sea
535 study areas. Interpolating between our calculations, the likely M_{TOL} threshold for nuisance in this area
536 is between M 4.5 – 5.0. The nuisance impacts from this event are consistent with its magnitude being
537 above our threshold for nuisance, while the absence of damage is consistent with this event being
538 below our M_{TOL} value for damage (which, as above, has not been estimated as it would exceed M_{MAX}).

539 The March 2022 M 5.2 event in the northern North Sea lies just to the east of our northern study area.
540 It was felt in Norway, the Shetlands, and the northeast Scottish mainland, and assigned a macroseismic
541 intensity of IV by the BGS (Galloway, 2023). Our M_{TOL} for nuisance in this area around M 5.1, and
542 the felt impacts from this event are consistent with its magnitude being above our M_{TOL} for nuisance.

543 In June 2017 an M 4.7 event occurred just to the east of our central study area. It was felt in the
544 Shetlands, Orkneys, and in some places along the northeast Scottish mainland (Galloway, 2018).
545 Reports generally describe relatively mild impacts, such as a “rumbling noise”, “like a heavy lorry”
546 passing by, or rattling windows and doors (Galloway, 2018). Our M_{TOL} for nuisance in this area around
547 M 4.7, and the impacts from this event are consistent with its magnitude being similar to our M_{TOL} for
548 nuisance.

549

550 **4.3 Comparison with Castor**

551 We also compare our M_{TOL} estimates with experience with one of the most notable examples of an
552 offshore facility being negatively impacted by induced seismicity. In doing so, we note that our M_{TOL}
553 estimates are based on ground motion models and fragility models that were not calibrated for the area
554 in question, and so an exact match between modelled and observed impacts should not be expected.

555 As described in our introduction, the Castor gas storage site was located approximately 20 km from
556 the eastern coast of Spain. It experienced three earthquakes with M 4.1 – 4.2 during its first weeks of
557 operation (Ruiz Barajas et al., 2017). These events were felt by the public along the coastline. The
558 resulting public concern led to significant protests such that injection was paused, and eventually the
559 entire project was closed down. We are not aware of any reports of damage from the Castor seismicity.

560 From our relationships between M_{TOL} and the distance to the coast shown in Figure 9, for an activity
561 that is located 20 km from the coast, we expect an M_{TOL} for nuisance of M 3.2, and an M_{TOL} for damage
562 of M 4.1. Our M_{TOL} value for nuisance is consistent with what occurred at Castor since the events,

563 which were significantly larger than our M_{TOL} , caused nuisance to the nearby population along the
564 coast such that the project was eventually abandoned. The largest of the Castor events just equalled
565 our M_{TOL} estimate for damage. Given the inherent variability in ground motions and seismic impacts,
566 the absence of reported damage from the Castor events is consistent with our model outcomes.

567

568 **4.4 M_{TOL} and induced seismicity management**

569 The M_{TOL} values that we have estimated represent the threshold of seismicity that would become
570 intolerable. The M_{TOL} values should inform induced seismicity management, but they do not represent
571 thresholds at which operations should be adjusted in order to mitigate induced seismicity risk. If
572 operations are not adjusted until after M_{TOL} is reached, then magnitude jumps and trailing events could
573 produce levels of seismicity that significantly exceed M_{TOL} (Verdon and Bommer, 2021). Hence,
574 actions to mitigate induced seismicity must be taken before induced event magnitudes reach M_{TOL} .

575 If a TLS is adopted to manage induced seismicity, then the red threshold, M_{RED} , must be set at a value
576 lower than M_{TOL} . Statistical considerations of induced seismicity sequences (Schultz et al., 2020b) and
577 observations of large numbers of sequences in practice (Verdon and Bommer, 2021; Watkins et al.,
578 2023) have indicated that TLS thresholds for long-term, low-pressure injection (such as CCS) should
579 be set approximately 1.5 to 2 magnitude units below M_{TOL} . This gap is needed to ensure that jumps
580 and trailing events as magnitudes approach M_{RED} do not exceed M_{TOL} .

581 For adaptive measures where magnitude forecasting models are used to manage induced seismicity, a
582 sufficient number of smaller events are required for model calibration. Many modelling strategies
583 require an estimate of the Gutenberg-Richter b -value, which in turn requires a bandwidth of several
584 units of magnitude to produce an accurate estimate (Roberts et al., 2015). Furthermore, modelled
585 increases in magnitude of 1 to 2 orders are commonly produced by such models (e.g., Schultz et al.,
586 2022; Verdon et al., 2024; Verdon and Eisner, 2024). Monitoring systems must therefore be capable
587 of detecting earthquake magnitudes that are significantly lower than M_{TOL} , by as much as two or three
588 orders of magnitude, to enable the use of an ATLS strategy.

589 Given our estimates for M_{TOL} , it is of interest to examine whether the existing UK national seismic
590 monitoring network provides sufficient monitoring capability to manage induced seismicity at offshore
591 CCS sites. The detection capability of the UK's national seismic network is shown in Baptie (2021).
592 Approximate ranges of detection capability for the areas in which CCS licenses are held are as follows:
593 East Irish Sea: $1.5 \leq M_D \leq 2.0$; English Channel: $1.5 \leq M_D \leq 2.0$; southern North Sea: $2.0 \leq M_D \leq 2.5$;
594 central North Sea: $2.25 \leq M_D \leq 2.75$; northern North Sea: $2.5 \leq M_D \leq 3.0$. The M_{TOL} values for nuisance
595 in these areas are: East Irish Sea: $3.0 \leq M_{TOL} \leq 3.5$; English Channel: $3.25 \leq M_{TOL} \leq 3.75$; southern
596 North Sea: $3.25 \leq M_{TOL} \leq 4.25$; central North Sea: $4.25 \leq M_{TOL} \leq 4.75$; northern North Sea:
597 $4.75 \leq M_D \leq 5.25$.

598 Hence, for the central and northern North Sea, the detection thresholds are 2 or more magnitude units
599 lower than M_{TOL} , implying that sufficient earthquake detection capability is available to provide useful
600 observations to manage induced seismicity risk. However, for the southern North Sea, East Irish Sea
601 and English Channel, the difference between M_D and M_{TOL} is roughly 1.25 to 1.5 magnitude units. As
602 such, modest improvements to existing monitoring capabilities for these areas may be warranted to
603 adequately manage the risks posed by induced seismicity.

604 Improvements in monitoring capabilities may be required to reduce location uncertainties – without
605 accurate locations it may be difficult to reliably distinguish induced events from natural earthquakes.
606 Furthermore, in addition to managing the risks posed by large induced seismic events, operators may
607 wish to install improved passive seismic monitoring capabilities around their CCS sites for other

608 purposes, such as to understand the geomechanical response of the reservoir to CO₂ injection and to
609 detect fracturing in the caprock, (e.g., Verdon et al., 2011, 2013; Stork et al., 2015).
610

611 **5. CONCLUSIONS**

612 The risks of induced seismicity during injection operations are typically managed by observing events
613 and adjusting activities accordingly. Decisions can be made via a TLS, or by using forecasting models
614 that estimate upcoming magnitudes. In either case, decisions should be made based on an
615 understanding of what earthquake magnitude will be tolerable to nearby populations. This tolerability
616 can be defined based on the likelihood of experiencing nuisance or of experiencing damage.

617 In this study we have calculated tolerability thresholds for the CCS operations that are expected to
618 commence in the seas around the UK in the coming decade. To do so, we adapted the method that was
619 developed by Schultz et al. (2023) for application to UK shale gas operations. Ground motions were
620 estimated over grids of given magnitude at a given location. For a specific level of ground motion, the
621 likelihood of experiencing nuisance or damage was estimated from fragility functions. The numbers
622 of affected households affected by a given impact were then estimated based on the population at a
623 given point. The thresholds for tolerability were defined based on past observations of induced event
624 impacts in the UK, and the tolerance, or lack of thereof, for these events as evidenced by the public
625 and regulatory responses.

626 Our primary results, the thresholds for tolerability mapped in Figures 5 – 8, can be used by the holders
627 of CCS license blocks around the UK (and the regulators thereof) as a key input to the design of
628 induced seismicity mitigation strategies for their upcoming projects.

629 We found that the first order control on M_{TOL} is the distance from the coast. The population density
630 along the coast and V_{S30} values also play a relatively smaller (but still important) role. As such, the
631 M_{TOL} values for future offshore CCS sites will depend on their location. Sites near to a densely
632 populated coast, such as in the East Irish Sea, English Channel, and southern North Sea, may exceed
633 the threshold for tolerance to nuisance at magnitudes as low as M 3.0. Sites in the central and northern
634 North Sea will have significantly higher thresholds for tolerability. We sense-checked our M_{TOL}
635 estimates against macroseismic impacts observed for past historical earthquakes occurring in the seas
636 around the UK, finding that our thresholds for nuisance and damage are consistent with the magnitudes
637 of past earthquakes that have been widely felt and/or caused damage.

638 To manage induced seismicity risks, earthquake monitoring systems must be able to detect magnitudes
639 significantly lower than M_{TOL} . By detecting smaller events, an operator can act to mitigate induced
640 seismicity, guided either by a TLS or by statistics-based forecasting models that are calibrated with
641 smaller events. In the central and northern North Sea, earthquake detection capabilities with the
642 existing BGS national seismic network are more than two orders of magnitude smaller than M_{TOL} .
643 However, in the East Irish Sea, English Channel, and southern North Sea, where M_{TOL} values are
644 smaller, the detection capability is in some places within 1.25 magnitude units of M_{TOL} . In these areas,
645 modest improvements in monitoring capabilities may be required to adequately manage induced
646 seismicity risks as the CCS industry develops.
647

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